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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of economic value and investment behavior of 
Spanish banks under the theory of investment for a multi-asset firm, focusing on three key 
issues: i) the distinction between immaterial and intangible assets and how each of them is 
related to the economic value of the firm; ii) the test of whether the accumulation of 
intangibles is a consequence of incurring adjustment costs or, on the contrary, intangibles 
are accumulated at no cost, and iii) how to account for market power in the valuation of the 
multi-assets firm. The empirical results quantify the contribution of material, immaterial 
(information technology and advertising) and intangible (organization capital) assets to 
economic value of Spanish banks, separated from the contribution of market power. We find 
that intangible assets build up from adjustment costs of investments in IT and rents from 
market power split evenly the economic value of the bank above the replacement cost 
of material and immaterial assets. 
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1 Introduction 
What underlies the stock-market value of a firm? This is a widely-posed research question in 
economics and management. At the turn of the 21st century, stock markets around the world 
routinely valued listed firms above their book values and investors inferred from this the end of 
the Old Economy (where tangible assets reported in balance sheets were the main productive 
resource) and the onset of a New Economy (where intangible assets, not reported in the 
balance sheets, will dominate the business landscape)1. At the micro level, differences in 
the market value of firms not explained by their respective book values have been attributed 
to intangibles (R&D, advertising, information technology), to market competition and to the 
firm’s competitive strategies2. The hope of the New Economy faded away with the bursting of 
the Internet bubble, but the interest in measuring intangibles and in determining how they 
contribute to the economic value of the firm continues to be high3. 
The theory of investment for multi-asset firms [Wildasin (1984), Hayashi and 
Inoue (1991), Bond and Cummins (2000)] provides a unified conceptual framework 
to investigate the determinants of the economic value of the firm, as well as the process of 
asset accumulation over time. Intangibles are one of the multiple assets of the firm, but 
the definition of what is an intangible asset is not unique. Most often, intangibles refer to 
immaterial assets such as those resulting from R&D, advertising and information technology 
(IT) expenditures. However, intangible assets can also be defined in a more restrictive 
way as the assets that firms build up internally as a sub-product of their regular activities 
such as production or investment in market-purchased assets. Examples of intangibles 
defined thus would be the “organization capital” of Prescott and Vischer (1980) and 
the new forms of organization and management of firms implemented to maximize the 
productivity of investments in IT (also referred to as organizational capital [Brynjolfsson, Hitt 
and Yang (2002)]). Within the narrower definition of intangibles there remain differences 
between those who consider that intangibles are costly [Cummins (2004)] and those who 
believe that they are free [Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002)]. This paper will use the term 
immaterial to refer to assets resulting from R&D, advertising or IT, and will reserve the 
word intangibles for assets built as sub-products of the regular production and investment 
activities of firms. 
                                                                          
1. Bond and Cummins (2000) present an excellent analysis of the debate around intangibles and the stock market 
valuation of firms. See also Nakamura (1999) and Lev (2001). 
2. Griliches (1981) is considered the pioneering work in evaluating the economic return from intangibles around R&D 
expenditures and patents. The work continued with Hirschey (1982) who evaluated the return of R&D and advertising; 
Jaffe (1986), who added measurement of spill over effects; and Hall (1993), who examined the change of return on 
investment in R&D over time. Later, interest shifted to the evaluation of returns from investment in Information 
Technologies (IT), Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) and Bharadwaj et al. (1999) among others. Papers that use market 
value data to investigate the effect of market structure, and the competitive decisions of firms on economic profits are 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Salinger (1984), with special attention to the effect of unionization, Smirlock et al. (1984), 
and Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), on diversification. Within the management literature, much of the empirical 
research since the early nineties under the Research Based View (RBV) of the firm has followed these early approaches 
to the determinants of economic value with little variation. [See Newbert (2007) for a complete list of papers on empirical 
research.] 
3. More recent papers on this topic are Bond and Cummins (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002), Cummins (2004), 
on IT capital and market value of firms; Toivanen et al. (2002) and Hall and Oriani (2006) apply the early research 
methodology to evaluate the return from R&D investment to countries outside the US; Villalonga (2004) explicitly links 
intangibles measured using the Griliches’ framework with the sustainability of competitive advantage and the literature 
on RBV of the firm. A distinctive feature of more recent research is that the definition of intangible assets is not the same 
for all authors, as is indicated later in this paper. 
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All approaches to intangibles recognize the complexity of measuring them, either 
because accounting practices do not capitalize immaterial assets built from expenditures 
in R&D, advertising and IT as capital, or because firms do not provide separate estimates of 
costs originated in organizational changes, or estimates of the adjustment costs of investment 
and growth. Since efficient capital markets will provide an estimate of the stock market value 
of listed firms, including the value attributed to all kind of assets normally invisible in 
accounting statements, one approach to valuing the intangible assets of a particular firm 
has been to observe the difference between its market value and its book value [Hall (2001)]. 
This approach has three clear limitations: first, it does not distinguish between immaterial and 
intangible assets; second, it makes no distinction between economic value and cost of the 
assets of the firm; and third, it assumes without proof that the rents from the market power of 
the firm, if any, are all part of the value attributed to intangibles4. 
Using the market value of a listed firm to value hidden intangibles presumes that 
investors can observe the internal decisions of firms, or they can use indirect information to 
estimate the quantity and quality of expenditures in intangibles made by firms, as well as the 
expected return from such investments. This is a strong assumption, since firms only publicly 
report, in an item-by-item form, a small fraction of the expenditures on immaterial assets, and 
none of the expenditures on intangibles. Under current accounting practices, firms often 
report expenditures on R&D as a separate line of the income statement, but expenditures on 
advertising, IT, process and organizational innovation, are all aggregated into operating 
expenses. A more realistic assumption is that the stock market value of the firm does not 
properly reflect the true economic value of those firms with high investments in immaterial and 
intangible assets. One way to improve market efficiency would be to change the current 
reporting practices, and ask firms to explicitly inform investors about stocks and flows 
of intangibles [Lev and Zarowin (1999), Healy et al. (2002)]. However, Kanodia et al. (2004) 
question the “value-relevance approach” of accounting policy and propose instead the 
“real-relevance approach”, that is, to make recommendations about external reporting 
practices that induce efficient investment decisions. 
The paper approaches the valuation and investment of immaterial and intangible 
assets using only accounting-related data, since very few of the firms in the data base are 
listed in the stock market. The paper does not focus on the value relevance of accounting 
data, but rather on whether we can explain the estimated present value of future profits 
and also explain the investment behavior of banks. Our accounting-related data come from 
different sources, the public accounting statements of banks and confidential reports sent by 
banks to the Banco de España. Next, the data is adjusted to obtain economically relevant 
measures of profits and costs of the assets. For example advertising expenditures are taken 
away from the income statement, capitalized and depreciated over time; additionally all assets 
are valued at replacement cost. The paper then allows us to calibrate the information 
content of economically adjusted accounting data, compared with that of raw accounting 
data, and also to asses the convenience of asking firms to disclose complementary data on 
immaterial assets so that external analysts can use them to explain the behavior of firms 
(banks in our case). It can be reasonably expected from the outset that banks and firms in 
general will make decisions, such as the amount invested in a particular asset, using internal 
                                                                          
4. This method also presumes perfect capital markets. When stock prices declined after the Internet crisis, most residual 
intangibles faded away. This appears implausible. One can raise the concern of using highly volatile, noisy and perhaps 
erroneous stock price data to estimate the economic value of the firm [Bond and Cummins (2000)]. Most banks in our 
sample data are not listed on the stock market, so their economic value is estimated using econometric techniques to 
forecast future earnings. 
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data that will be different from the data reported in external accounting statements, but the 
expectation should be empirically confirmed, as we do in the paper. 
 The paper begins with a brief overview of the dynamic model for the 
value-maximizing, multi-asset firm that incurs adjustment costs for investing in 
market-purchased assets, and at the same time faces an inelastic demand for the 
product sold in the market (market power). Adjustment costs play a key role in explaining 
why existing assets can be more valuable than those sold in the market [Abel (1990)]. 
The difference in values provides an estimate for the intangible assets acquired in the 
process of adjustments needed to make the new investments fully productive. This value of 
intangibles does not correspond to the economic rents or extraordinary profits of the firm, 
but to the costs incurred in producing them, so intangibles can also be valued at their 
production cost. Of course, intangibles may contribute to the market power and economic 
rents of the firm, but they do so jointly with the other assets of the firm. 
The solution to the model provides two main equations, empirically tested using data 
on Spanish banks in the period 1984 to 2003. One of the equations determines the economic 
value of the firm (present value of expected future cash flows) as a function of the 
replacement cost of the assets and of the discounted economic rents from market power. 
The other equation determines the investment rate in material assets as a function of the 
economic value of the firm, of the investment rate of non-material assets and, when the firm 
has market power, of the opportunity loss of expanding capacity. The two equations allow us 
to formulate empirically testable propositions around the hypothesis that intangible assets 
are costly to produce, and around the hypothesis that the economic value of the firm 
incorporates rents from market power that are differentiated from returns that just 
compensate for the replacement cost of existing assets. The fact that the propositions can be 
tested twice, from the valuation and from the investment equations, provides robustness to 
our conclusions. Moreover, the empirical analysis of the valuation and investment of 
the multi-asset banking firm, and in particular the study of the economic effects of large 
investments in IT made by banks, is new in the banking literature. 
The paper is related to Lindenberg and Ross (1981) on economic valuation of the 
firm with market power, although our analysis extends the model to account for 
multiple assets and for non-zero adjustment costs. Other related studies are Bond and 
Cummins (2000), who model and estimate the investment equation of the multi-asset firm, 
and Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) and Cummins (2004), who model and empirically 
test the determinants of the economic value of the multi-asset firm. Our contribution here 
is the extension of these models to include a more detailed explanation of the relationship 
between adjustment costs and intangibles, and to allow for the market power of banks. 
In the empirical part of the analysis, we take advantage of the available data on training 
expenditures by banks to provide a direct test of the adjustment cost incurred in investing in 
IT capital. As indicated, the paper is also related to the literature on the accounting policy of 
intangibles. The contribution here is, on the one hand, methodological (for example, in terms 
of identifying the correct valuation and investment model in testing the value-relevance of 
reporting intangibles) and, on the other hand, conceptual, since it raises the issue of whether 
the observed behavior of unlisted firms is better explained by conventional accounting 
variables than by economically adjusted ones. 
 Our evidence documents the growing importance of IT and, to a lesser extent, 
advertising capital, among Spanish banks in the past twenty years. Second, the results 
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support the hypothesis that intangibles are costly: those banks that are able to grow faster 
in the accumulation of IT capital, are the same banks that incur higher training costs for their 
workers. Third, banks have market power, which implies that the economic value of the bank 
is above the replacement cost of all the invested assets, including immaterial and intangible 
assets. The paper provides estimates of this market power, separate from estimates of 
the replacement costs of immaterial and intangible assets not reported in the balance 
sheet of banks. Fourth, advertising capital appears as the asset most highly correlated with 
the economic rents of the banks, together with intangibles from training expenditures. 
When the contribution of market power to the economic value of the banks is isolated 
then advertising only contributes to economic value in an amount equal to the replacement 
cost of the investment. Finally, raw accounting data does not explain the investment behavior 
of banks, while economically adjusted data does. 
Section 2 presents the basic model of the multi-asset firm that maximizes economic 
value. It also examines alternative hypotheses for the contribution of market-purchased and 
internally-generated assets to the economic value of the firm, and derives the investment 
equations implied by the value-maximization model. In section 3, we provide empirical 
estimates of the valuation and investment equations, using data for Spanish banks, and test 
the main implications of the theoretical models. The conclusions summarize the main results 
of the paper. 
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2 Economic value maximization with multiple assets5 
Consider a firm that, in each time period, decides how much to invest in each type of N 
different market purchased capital goods, It = (I1t, I2t,…,INt). The firm holds a stock of capital 
services at the beginning of the period t, Kt-1 = (K1t-1,…,KNt-1) that changes over time as the 
result of new investments and of the depreciation of old ones, 
( )j ,t s j ,t s j ,t sK K I for j 1,...., M and s+ + − += − δ + = >11 0  (1) 
where δϕ is the depreciation rate of capital asset j. 
 
Let Π(Ks, Is, es) be the net cash flow of the firm in period s as a function of the stock 
and the investment flow of the assets in the period, and of the random productivity shock es, 
once the variable inputs are already optimized. The cash flow function has three separate 
components: gross profits from operations, adjustment costs, and the outlay from the current 
market purchased assets: 
( ) ( ) ( )s s s s s s s js js
j
K ,I ,e R K ,e C K ,I p IΠ = − − ∑  
Gross revenue R(.) is in turn equal to price, p (QP (Ks)), times quantity of product sold 
QP(Ks), R(.) = p (QP (Ks)) QP(Ks) where price is non increasing with quantity sold (i.e. firms can 
have market power); pjs is the current market purchase price of one unit of capital asset j. 
And C(.) is the adjustment cost function which is assumed separable in the adjustment costs 
of each of the assets in which the firm invests, 
( ) j js s j j j j j j
jj j
b I
C( K ,I ) C K ,I p a K
K
⎛ ⎞= = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
2
2
 (2) 
where bj is a positive (cost) parameter and aj is the stationary investment rate for which 
adjustment costs are zero (in general equal to δϕ, the depreciation rate). The economic value 
of the firm in period t, Vt, will be equal to the present value of expected future cash flows6, 
( )tt t s s s s
s t
V E K ,I ,e
∞
=
⎧ ⎫= β ⋅ Π⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑  
where Et is the expectations operator, conditional on the information available at the 
beginning of period t, and β ts is the discount factor. 
The firm chooses I and K to maximize Vt subject to (1). If λj,t+s is the multiplier of the 
respective constraint in (1) the first order conditions of the maximization problem are as 
follows [see Bond and Cummins (2000) appendix A], 
                                                                          
5. This section is based on Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Wildasin (1984) Hayashi and Inoue (1991) Bond and 
Cummins (2000). 
6. The paper uses “value” as synonymous of willingness to pay. The value of the firm means the willingness to pay 
for the stream of cash flow expected over time. 
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( )'Ijt t t t jtK ,I ,e−Π = λ  (3) 
( ) ttjt j t t j ,t
jt
E
K + +
⎛ ⎞∂Π ⎡ ⎤λ = + − δ β λ⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ 1 1
1  (4) 
( )st t st s j
j ,t ss
E ( j ,...,N
K
∞ +
+=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂Π= β − δ ∀ =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑
0
1 1   
 
Equation (3) gives the first order optimal condition for investment flow in each 
period t, and it establishes that the value-maximizing investment is that for which the 
marginal cost of the investment (-Π’I) equals the marginal return from the last unit of invested 
capital, given by the shadow price of capital asset j,, λjt. On the other hand, equation (4) 
is the first order condition for the stock of capital asset j and it states that the marginal 
return from asset j is equal to the present value of the future expected returns derived from a 
marginal increase in the stock of asset j. Combing (3) and (4) this marginal return in terms of 
discounted cash flows is also equal to the marginal cost of investment in asset j. 
The dynamic optimization problem has been applied to the study of the investment 
behaviour of firms [Wildasin (1984), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Hayashi (1992), Bond and 
Cummins (2000)]7; to study the valuation of the stock of invested assets [Brynjolfsson, 
Hitt and Yang (2002), Cummins (2004)]; and to investigate the market power of firms 
[Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and references listed in note 2]. Papers on investment and 
valuation often assume that firms do not have market power, while Lindenberg and Ross 
(and the large number of papers inspired by their model) ignore adjustment costs. Next we 
provide an integrated view of this literature, with special attention to the relationship between 
intangibles and adjustment costs of growth. 
2.1 General valuation 
Assuming that cash flows are linear and homogeneous in K and I, and that firms face an 
inelastic demand for the product they sell (market power), in the optimal solution the 
economic value of the firm satisfies the condition [Bond and Cummins (2000), Lindenberg 
and Ross (1981)]. 
( ) ( ) ( )M tt jt jt jt s s s
j s t
V K I p QP( K ) QP K
∞
=
= λ − + β ⋅ε∑ ∑ 1  (5) 
Where all variables are evaluated at the optimal values and ∑ is the absolute value of 
the price-elasticity of demand. 
If the firm does not have market power, the price elasticity is infinite and the last 
term of equation (5) will be zero. Given the adjustment cost function in (2), equation (3) implies 
'
Ijjtjt Cp +=λ . Substituting in (5), 
                                                                          
7. The paper focuses only on investment equations based on Tobin’s q, equation (3), and will not consider investment 
models based on Euler conditions, equation (4). 
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( ) ( ) ( )
I j
N N
'
t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt t
j j j
V K I p K I C K I e
∞
= λ − = − + − +∑ ∑ ∑  (5.1) 
The first term in (5.1) establishes that the economic value of the firm in the 
optimal solution is equal to the sum of the contributions to economic value of each 
market-purchased asset. The contribution of asset j is equal to marginal return λjt times the 
stock of asset j at the end of the period. The second term is the consequence of substituting 
the value-maximizing condition of marginal return equal to marginal cost of the asset 
[equation (3)]. Therefore, in the value-maximizing solution, the contribution of each asset to 
the value of the firm is just equal to the opportunity cost of the asset, and the economic 
value of the firm is just equal to the replacement cost of all its invested assets. 
The replacement cost has two components, the outlays needed to purchase the 
services of capital from the market at current prices, plus the outlays needed to install 
the market-purchased assets to make them fully productive. In the stationary solution, where 
adjustment costs are zero (firms only invest the amount needed to replace depreciated 
assets, and CIj’=0), equation (5.1) implies that the economic value of the firm in the 
competitive market will be equal to the current purchase cost of the invested assets. This is 
the long-term zero profit condition, similar to the period-by-period condition that firms 
earn accounting profits equal to those needed to compensate for the opportunity cost of 
capital invested8. 
If the firm has market power, but adjustment costs are zero, and there is only one 
capital asset, equation (5) transforms into the valuation equation derived by Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981), 
( ) ( ) ( )
t
t
t K t t s t
s t
V p K I p QP QP K
∞
=
= − + β ⋅ε∑ 1  (5.2) 
Now, the economic value of the firm in the optimal solution is equal to the market 
purchase cost of the asset, plus the present value of economic rents from market power9. 
2.2 Investment  
Assume first that the firm has no market power. Substituting C’Ij from (2) in (3) and 
re-arranging the terms, it gives the optimal investment path of the firm as a function of 
the ratio λjt / pjt = qjt, 
( )jt j jt t
jt j
I
a q e
K b
= + − +1 1  
                                                                          
8.  Equation (5) can also be related to the methodology often used to estimate the return from intangible assets, 
inspired by Griliches (1981). Assuming only two assets, tangible A and intangible KI, equation (5) is written as 
V = λ1A+λ2KI = λ1A(1+λ2KI/λ1A).  
9.  These economic profits can be interpreted as follows. Let ct be the user cost of capital. Profits in period t are given 
by Rt - ctKt. The profit maximizing price of the period implies that (p-mc)/p=1/ε, where mc is the marginal cost, equal to 
average cost under constant returns to scale, mc=ctKt/QPt. Therefore ( ) ( )t tp( QP ) QP( K ) p mc QP K⋅ = − ⋅ε
1
 is the 
economic profit, after the imputed user cost of capital, of the firm in period t. This result also implies that if the firm earns 
a return on assets, at replacement cost, equal to the user cost of capital, its economic value will be equal to the 
replacement cost of market-purchased assets. On the other hand, with market power, the economic value of the firm is 
equal to the replacement cost of assets plus the present value of expected future economic profits. Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981) also show that, from Tobin’s q, it is possible to obtain upper limits on the measure of market power in terms 
of the Lerner index, (Q-1)/Q ≥( p-mc)/p. 
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This equation is the basis of the “q theory of investment” [Hayashi (1982)]. 
The optimal (value-maximizing) investment rate decreases with the slope parameter of the 
adjustment cost function, b, and increases with the value of marginal qj: the ratio between 
the increase in economic value V from one additional unit of capital asset j (economic 
value of the last unit invested), and the purchase price of one unit of capital asset j. In the 
stationary equilibrium solution, the marginal value equals the marginal cost of the asset; thus, 
jt
jt j
jt
I
q , a
K
= =1  
When there is only one asset, under certain regularity conditions, the unobservable 
marginal q can be replaced by the average q [Hayashi (1982)] and the value of q is estimated 
as the ratio between the total economic value of the firm (equal to market value of equity plus 
debt if the firm is listed on the stock market) divided by the purchase cost of the asset already 
invested. With multiple assets, the investment function is less straightforward [Wildasin (1984), 
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Bond and Cummins (2000)]. Divide both sides of (5) by p1K1t-1, that 
is the replacement cost of asset 1 at the beginning of the year; after some re-arrangement, 
the new equation is, 
M M
j j ,t j j j ,tt
t t
t t t j tj j
K p KV Ie b a e
p K p p K K p p K
− −
− − − −= =
λ λ⎛ ⎞λ= + + = − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
1 11 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2
 (6) 
Since the investment in asset j can be assumed to be proportional to the marginal q 
of the asset, the unobservable marginal q of asset j can be substituted by its investment rate, 
that is
1
1
−
−≅
jt
jj
j
j
j
K
I)(
b
p
δλ
. Substituting in (6), and again after some re-arrangement, 
 
M
j j j jt
t
t t tj
b ( ) p II Va e
K b p K b ( ) p K− − −=
− δ⎛ ⎞= + − − +⎜ ⎟ − δ⎝ ⎠ ∑1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
11
1
1
 (7) 
 
If asset 1 includes all tangible assets, and the non-tangible assets fully depreciate 
during the period when expenditures are made (δj=0 for j>1), equation (7) will give the 
investment rate of tangible assets as a function of average q, 111 −tt KpV of the asset 
(the terms on the right-hand side after the negative sign will all be zero). When immaterial 
assets do not depreciate instantly, and adjustment costs are positive, the investment model 
of tangible assets as a function only of average q of tangible assets will be mis-specified, 
unless the investments in immaterial assets are uncorrelated with the economic value of 
the firm. In general, immaterial assets are part of the investment equation and should not be 
omitted in the specification of the model. The negative association between investment in 
tangible assets and investment in immaterial assets, from (7), can be interpreted as showing 
that average q for tangible assets 111 −tt KpV  will over-estimate the marginal return from 
investment in these assets, since a substantial part of market value V will reflect the economic 
value of immaterial assets. When modelling the investment in tangible assets, one must 
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correct for the excess value of ratio q for only tangible assets; the negative coefficients of the 
investment rates in intangibles provide this correction10. 
The investment equation can be generalized in the case where firms have market 
power and the term ( ) ( )t
ts
t
s KQPQPp∑ ⋅
∞
= εβ
1
is positive. Equation (7) is now written as 
 
M
j j j jt t
t
t t t ,tj
b ( ) p IV p ( Q P )Q PI a e
K b p K b ( ) p K p K− − − −=
− δ⎛ ⎞= + − − − φ +⎜ ⎟ − δ⎝ ⎠ ∑1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
11
1
1
 
(8) 
 
where the parameter φ is inversely related to the elasticity of demand and to the expectations 
about growth of sales and sustainability of economic rents from market power over time. 
The last negative term of the investment equation accounts for the opportunity loss that 
new investment produces in rents from existing assets, due to the lower selling price after 
increasing production capacity and demand. 
2.3 Intangible assets 
This paper uses the word intangibles in a restrictive way, referring only to those 
assets that the firm generates internally as an outcome of the adjustment costs incurred 
in production, and in making new investments fully productive. 
In Prescott and Vischer (1980), intangibles take the form of what the authors call 
“organization capital” (the information accumulated by the firm jointly with producing 
output, for example information about the match between workers and the task, the match 
between employees working in teams, and enhancing the human capital stock by on the 
job training). The cost of accumulating organizational capital has to do with the restrictions 
on output that firms trade off with having additional capital. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) 
refer to the costs of implementing new processes, the costs of training, and design of 
incentive systems to make computer technology fully productive. These costs must have 
a counterpart in terms of benefits for the firm, so Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) argue that, while 
incurring such costs, “managers must believe that they are investing in an economic asset”. 
Intangibles can be made explicit in the model above, as follows. Let Mj be the stock 
of intangible and let Π (K, M, I) be the extended profit function of the firm. The stock Mj will 
vary over time as the net result of depreciation, and the flow of new intangibles from current 
expenses in adjustment costs, Cj 
( ) M,...,j)C(fMxM
tjt,jjjt
11 1 =+⋅−= −  
(9) 
where x is the depreciation rate of the intangible assets and m= f(C) is the flow of intangibles 
produced with the adjustment costs incurred in period t, which in turn depend on I and K 
[from equation (2)]. This is a new constraint to be added to the value maximization problem. 
                                                                          
10. Hayashi and Inoue (1991) propose an alternative approach to model investment in firms with multiple assets. 
The approach is based on the idea that firms optimally aggregate all assets into a single measure of capital 
services, φ(Kt+1). The aggregation method consists of constructing a Divisia index of capital so that φ(Kt+1)=ΣcjtKjt+1 
where cj is the user cost of capital. 
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Maintaining our other assumptions, if zj is the Lagrange multiplier (shadow price) of (9), 
equation (3.1) is now formulated as11, 
j
' ' '
jt jt Ij j C Ijp C z f Cλ = + −  
(3.2) 
The marginal cost of investment in asset j [the right-hand side of (3.2)] is now lower, 
since investment produces an externality in the form of valuable intangible assets. 
The externality is equal to the shadow price of one unit of intangible (marginal return, z) 
times the intangibles produced per unit of investment, fIj’(Cj) = f’Cj C’Ij. This benefit is directly 
subtracted from the replacement cost of asset j. The marginal cost of intangibles produced 
by investing in asset j is C’m = C’Ij/m’Ij = C’Ij/(C’Ij f’Cj) = 1/f’Cj. If the marginal return must be 
equal to the marginal cost in the optimal solution, then zj = 1/f’Cj. Substituting in (3.2), 
we have λjt = pjt. In the optimal production of intangibles the marginal return of the market 
purchased asset is just equal to the purchase price of the asset, and the marginal adjustment 
cost of the market-purchased asset is driven to zero. This result would be modified if one 
realistically assumes that the accumulation of intangible assets has its own adjustment costs 
so, as in Prescott and Vischer (1980), it would be the cost of accumulating intangibles that 
limits the growth of the firm. 
 Assuming no market power, and that adjustment costs endow firms with valuable 
intangible assets, the economic value of the firm in the optimal solution [equation (5)] will be 
given by 
( ) ( )N Nt j jt jt j jt j jt
j j
V p K I z M f (C ) e= − + − +∑ ∑  
(5.2) 
where z = 1/f’C. Equation (5.2) is a special case of (5.1) where λjt = pjt [from (3.2)] and 
the value-maximization problem has the additional constraint (9) that describes the process 
of accumulation of intangible assets over time. Since Mj is the intangible generated from 
the investment in asset j, it can be expected that this stock of intangibles will co-vary with the 
stock of asset j. Assuming that M is proportional to K, and that the proportion is in turn equal 
to the marginal change of m with respect to I, then M = sK = f’I K = f’CC’I K. Substituting 
in (5.2), the economic value of the firm is given by, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )N N N' ' 't j jt jt Cj Ij jt jt j Ij jt jt t'
j j jCj
V p K I f C K I p C K I e
f
= − + − = + − +∑ ∑ ∑1  (5.1) 
Under the above assumptions, the contribution of intangibles to the value of the firm 
is just equal to the adjustment costs incurred in the investment process. 
To illustrate the former results consider a firm that trains workers in the use of 
computers. Training costs are part of the adjustment costs of investing in computers, so 
from (9) one can estimate the replacement cost in human capital through training activities. 
Such costs will also be part of the optimal economic value of the firm, just as are the 
replacement costs of machinery or other physical capital. The return for the firm is in the form 
                                                                          
11. This result follows from the new first order condition with respect to I, -Π’I (K, M, I) = λjt + zj f’Ij(C) and therefore 
λjt = - Π’I (K, M, I) - zj f’Ij(C). It is assumed that adjustment costs C always originate as a consequence of investment 
in market purchased assets. 
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of lower marginal adjustment costs and higher investment rates in computers, according 
to (3.2). Computers are more valuable, when used by trained workers, than they would be 
without training (the difference between installed and uninstalled market purchased asset), 
but firms incur a cost to achieve such increase of value. In a competitive market, where firms 
are price takers, cost and value are expected to be equal and, consequently, long term profits 
will be equal to zero. 
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3 Application to the Spanish banking industry 
3.1 Data 
The framework of the measurement and determinants of economic value and the investment 
rate of firms, presented in section 2, is now applied to data on Spanish commercial and 
savings banks from 1984 to 2003. Credit cooperatives and branches of foreign banks are 
excluded, because of the lack of relevant data, in the case of cooperatives, and because 
most foreign banks are not active in retail banking. The banks in the sample represent 
89.25% of total banking assets in Spain in the year 2003. The primary data come from 
confidential reports submitted to Banco de España by Spanish banks (balance sheets, 
income statements and complementary notes) at the non consolidated level. These data 
allow us to obtain estimates of the investment flow and capital stock of four main types 
of assets: Physical (KPh), Information Technology (KIT), Advertising (KAd) and Financial (KFE) 
assets. Physical operating capital includes buildings (mainly branches) and long-lived assets 
excluding those having to do with computer hardware or software. IT capital is set equal to 
the sum of the assets reported in the balance sheet under the label of information technology, 
plus the capitalization of annual expenditures in IT reported in the income statement using the 
perpetual inventory method [equation (1)]. The stock of Advertising capital is obtained 
applying the perpetual inventory method to the annual flow (investment) of advertising 
expenditures, as reported in the income statement of banks. Finally, Financial assets is the 
counterpart, on the asset side of the balance sheet, of bank equity remaining after financing 
the assets used in production and sales [Equity-(Physical + IT + Advertising)]. Regulatory 
requirements on the minimum capital ratio for banks explain that this difference is positive for 
banks under normal conditions. The stocks of each of the assets are valued at current 
estimated purchase cost in the market, calculated using the official price index of capital 
goods and services, and an estimate of economic depreciation12. 
For banks with market power, the valuation and investment equations depend, 
among other variables, on revenues from sales. Banks can have market power on both 
loan and deposit markets, so for each bank, data are collected on interest paid on 
deposits ID, and on gross profit margins in loans (interest on loans minus opportunity 
cost of loans at the interbank interest rate), GLP; the gross margin of loans is used, rather 
than total revenue, in order to avoid double-counting, since compensation to deposits is one 
component of the cost of loans. 
For certain years during the time period, banks also report individual data on 
training expenditures, which will be used to obtain a proxy for adjustment costs. Since a 
year-by-year variable of training expenditures is not available, the proxy is constructed 
using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a bank that expends in training per 
worker an amount which is above the median of the distribution of training expenditures 
per worker across banks (KHhigh = 1), and 0 for the remaining banks (KHhigh = 0). 
Only a few of the banks in the sample are listed on the stock market. Since the 
market value of the bank based on the market price of issued shares is not available, 
the fundamental economic value of the bank, equal to the discounted present value of 
future expected cash flows, must be estimated using earnings forecasts and discount 
                                                                          
12. For a full description of the data see Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007). See also the Appendix of this 
paper for a summary of the method followed to obtain the adjusted economic data on banks. 
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factors for each bank in the sample. Other studies [Abel and Blanchard (1986), Bond and 
Cummins (2000)] have questioned the use of share price to obtain estimates of the economic 
value of the firm, even when they are available arguing that share price only reflects 
the fundamental value of the firm under perfect financial market conditions. In this paper, 
we do not have that option, but the method used to calculate economic value is validated 
through its use in previous studies. 
The economic value of the bank will be set equal to the present value of the 
predicted future profits, discounted at the cost of capital of the bank. In this paper, we follow 
the approach of Abel and Blanchard and forecast the future earnings of each bank using an 
ARIMA econometric model. The economic value of a bank i in year t is then calculated 
as follows, 
i ,t i ,t
tt t t itiit it i ,t i ,t i ,t
it it
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆV P P P P+ +
+ ρ= + ξ + ξ + ξ ξ − ρ
2 3
1 2
1
 
(10) 
where t st,iPˆ + are the predicted adjusted profits of bank i at time t+s, given the information 
available at time t using an AR(2) model; t,iξ is the discount factor of each bank, inversely 
related to the opportunity cost of capital of that bank at time t. The opportunity cost 
of capital of the bank is equal to the risk-free interest rate plus a risk premium that 
takes into account the risk of loans plus the risk from debt leverage. Adjusted profits 
are obtained from accounting profits reported by banks modified as follows: adjusted 
profits = accounting profits + expenditures on advertising and IT + amortization – estimated 
economic depreciation of material and immaterial assets at current purchased cost. 
From t+3 onwards, the level of profit of banks is calculated applying a constant 
expected growth rate iρ to the average of the predictions for t, t+1 and t+2, tiP . It is assumed 
that this rate of growth of profit is equal to the profit retention rate times the long-run Return 
Over Equity (ROE). The proxy value of the long-term growth rate itρ  is obtained assuming 
that banks retain one half of their earnings, and further assuming that the long-term ROE 
is equal to the average of the ROE of the last three years. The long-term discount factor itξ  
has been approximated to the average of the opportunity cost of capital of the bank in the 
previous three-year period13. 
 Table 1 provides year-by-year statistics of the estimated economic value, V, and of 
the market purchased assets at their estimated current purchase costs, for each year 
from 1984 to 2003 (in thousands of euros). All values are at current prices. Roughly, 
in the twenty-year period, the median-estimated economic value per bank, and the 
median-estimated replacement cost of each asset, are multiplied by a factor of ten or more, 
except Financial assets, which have grown at a much faster rate, and Commercial capital, 
which has multiplied its median by a factor of 8.3. The relative importance of immaterial 
assets (IT and Advertising Capital) has grown with respect to Physical capital, though the 
                                                                          
13. In order to test for possible biases in our measure of the economic value of banks, for those banks listed on 
the market, we estimate the actual market value of the bank as the product of share price and number of issued 
shares at the end of each year. Then we postulate and estimate a linear equation model, where the dependent variable 
is the actual market price, Market, and the explanatory variable is our estimated economic value of the bank, Econvalue. 
The results of the estimation are Market . . Econvalue= 8 + ⋅469 107  (87 observations). The null hypothesis of intercept 
equal to zero and slope equal to one are not rejected at the 5% level of significance or less. Therefore, we have 
no evidence that our estimate of the economic value of banks is a biased estimate of their market value if they 
were listed on the stock market. 
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latter remained the principal asset component in 200314. Table 2 has a similar structure, but 
for investment rates. These rates differ across assets, low for physical and financial assets, 
high for IT and advertising; these differences in investment rates reflect differences in 
depreciation rates and cross-substitution among assets. The descriptive data are completed 
with Table 3, which provides information on the ratio between the economic value of the 
bank and the current purchase costs of all assets listed in Table 1 (average Tobin q for 
the aggregation of all assets). Since q equal to one is the benchmark for zero economic 
profits (assuming no adjustment costs), the median Spanish bank earns extraordinary profits 
in almost all the years of the period. Extraordinary profits start high (q ratio close to 3) and 
disappear in the middle period (the value falls to 0.94 in 1994), when the country was starting 
to come out of a serious economic recession. Finally, they rise again at the end of the sample 
period, but remain at values lower than 2. Increasing competition in the last part of the period 
(coinciding with the full liberalization of the banking sector) compressed economic profits, 
but not to the point of falling to zero. The coefficient of variation, standard deviation over 
mean, and the percentile range, also decrease over time, indicating convergence in economic 
profits across banks. 
Table 3 also shows, for comparison, the mean and standard deviation of the Tobin’s 
q if it was computed using the accounting net profit (without adjustments) to estimate 
the economic value of the bank (present value), and using book value of equity in the 
denominator. We observe the same trend in both variables, but the Tobin’s q at book 
value for the median bank is always substantially higher than that calculated with assets 
at replacement-cost. Accounting profits are lower than adjusted profits, since, in the former, 
advertising and IT expenditures are considered costs of the period and, in the latter, they are 
investments to be capitalized. Therefore, economic value is lower with accounting profits than 
with adjusted profit. On the other hand, equity at book value is much lower than assets at 
replacement costs. 
3.2 Empirical model and econometric issues 
There are two equations to be estimated, equation (5), with variations on intangibles, (5.2), 
that corresponds to the economic value of the bank, and the investment equation (8). 
3.2.1 VALUATION 
The standard approach in the literature has been to estimate the economic value of the 
firm as a function of the assets in the balance sheet at book value, or at replacement cost. 
Using our notation the equation to be fitted to the firm level data is written as 
( )( )Nt j j jt jt t
j
V p K I e= α − +∑  (5.3) 
where αj are the parameters to be estimated. According to the results in the theory section, 
this empirical model ignores two sets of additional explanatory variables, intangibles and 
revenues. To simplify the exposition, assume first that banks do not have market power 
so the true model is (5.2), 
( )( ) ( )Nt j j jt jt j j t
j
V p K I M f ( C ) e= α − + − +∑ ∑  (5.2) 
                                                                          
14. For a detailed analysis of the composition of banks’ assets and their evolution over time, see Martín-Oliver, 
Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007). 
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Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) estimate equation (5.3) with two additional 
assumptions, zero adjustment costs and that the unobservable stock of intangibles 
is linearly correlated with observed capital stock j in the form )IK(va)C(fM jjjjjj −+=− , 
where a and v are non-negative parameters. Zero-adjustment cost implies that the estimated 
coefficient in model (5.3) will be αj = 1 + νj. Consequently, νj = αj-1 gives the monetary units of 
intangible assets generated by measurable asset j. 
When the realistic assumption of adjustment cost is restored, from (5.1), the 
estimated coefficient in (5.3) would be αj = (1 + C’Ij). Consequently αj-1 = C’Ij provides 
an estimate of the marginal adjustment cost of investment in asset j. Cummins (2004) 
assumes that intangible assets are unobservable and independent of the stock of asset j. 
However, the value-maximizing condition requires that the marginal cost-adjustment 
of investment C’Ij be equal to the marginal return from intangibles built around asset j. 
Therefore, according to Cummins, αj-1 provides an estimate of the marginal return from 
intangibles, as opposed to Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002). Now, the total replacement 
cost of intangibles accumulated through the investment process in asset j would be equal 
to ( ) 111 −− =− tj' jItjj KpCKpα . 
The approach of Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) to the measurement of 
intangibles is not empirically distinguishable from the method proposed in this paper, 
but it has different implications when a proxy of adjustment costs is included to explain the 
economic value of the firm. One of the adjustment costs faced by firms is the expenditure 
to train workers when a new technology is adopted. Our data base provides partial 
information on the training expenditures of banks that can be used to construct the dummy 
variable KHhigh as a proxy of intangibles built from training expenditures. 
Equation (3.2) predicts that banks with higher training expenditures (higher 
intangibles) will have lower marginal adjustment costs than banks with low training 
expenditures. Therefore, if intangibles built up through training activities are valuable for the 
firm, then C’I(KHhigh)<C’I(KHlow). If training expenditures are adjustment costs resulting from 
investments in IT capital, then it is expected that the estimated coefficient of the IT capital 
variable in the valuation and investment equations will be lower in banks with high training 
expenditures. On the other hand, if there were no adjustment costs, as Brynjolfsson, Hitt and 
Yang (2002) assume, then intangibles built through training expenditures will be directly 
incorporated into the economic value of the bank. To discriminate between the two 
hypotheses, the explanatory variables KHhigh and ITj
high KKH ×  are added to the basic model. 
If intangibles resulting from training really do lower the adjustment costs of investing in IT 
capital, then the estimated coefficient of ITj
high KKH × is expected to be negative, and the 
estimated coefficient of KHhigh positive (model 5.2). If intangibles are free, and grow in parallel 
with the investment in IT, then the coefficient of KH is expected to be positive and the 
coefficient of ITj
high KKH × is expected to be non-negative. 
If banks have market power, the omission of revenues from loans and deposits 
in the empirical equation (5.3) will be another source of miss-specification. Revenues are 
expected to be correlated with the other assets if they contribute to increase demand 
and/or make it less price elastic (for example, through advertising) and, consequently, the 
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in (5.3) will over-estimate the marginal 
adjustment costs of intangibles. 
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The actual model to be estimated is formulated as follows, 
j high high IT
it i it ij jt it it it i i jt it
j J
lnV mln p K d ln ID d  ln GLP c KH c KH ln p K
∈
=µ + +η + +εµ + + + + ⋅∑0 1 2 1 2
J={Ph, IT, Ad , FE};   ηι , mit , εit ~ iid(0, σk); k={η , m ,ε } (11) 
where sub-index i refers to the bank and t to the time period. The equation is formulated in 
logs, since the estimated value of the elasticity µj will provide a direct estimate of the relative 
contribution of asset j to the economic value of the bank, )V/K()V/K(V jjj
'
jKj
λµ == 15. 
Super-indices Ph, IT, Ad and FE are the identifying labels of Physical, IT, Advertising and 
Financial types of capital, and ID and GLP stand for deposit interest and gross loan profits, 
respectively. The error term is made up of three components: ηι or bank-specific effects that 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across banks; mit, that accounts for the measurement 
error in the calculation of the value of the capital stocks and, finally, ειτ, a random term 
that captures productivity shocks, measurement errors of the dependent variable, and other 
disturbances not explained by the model. 
The elasticity µj is expected to be non-negative. It is assumed that the elasticity 
of the economic value to the stock of asset j is constant over time and equal across banks. 
Time-dummy variables and firm-specific fixed effects capture time-varying factors common to 
all banks, and bank-specific effects constant over time. Market power of banks in the deposit 
and loan markets imply d1, d2>0. Finally we have c1>0 and c2<0 from the assumptions of 
training expenditures as a source of adjustment costs. 
The estimation of (11) with the OLS techniques, and the like, will produce biased 
estimates of the parameters, since the explanatory variables are correlated with the error 
term (productivity shocks, in εit, affect both the value of the firm and the investment policy 
and, consequently, the value of the capital stock). In addition, measurement errors (mit) 
are correlated by definition with the explanatory variables. Finally, another source of potential 
correlation arises due to the existence of bank-specific effects in the error term that control 
for unobservable heterogeneity and can be correlated to the explanatory variables, leading 
to inconsistent estimates of the parameters16. The standard econometric solution to these 
potential estimation problems is to take first differences, to eliminate unobservable 
firm-specific effects, and use lagged values of the variables as instruments. However, it has 
been shown that if the persistence17 of the variables that enter into the regression is high, 
then the lagged values are no longer good instruments for the first differentiated variables, 
and this gives inconsistent estimates of the parameters. Blundell and Bond (1998) propose 
additional orthogonal conditions that are instrumented through the so-called System-GMM 
estimator, and assure consistent parameter estimates in the presence of a high degree of 
persistence of the variables. Model (12) is then estimated using the GMM system. 
                                                                          
15. The marginal return = marginal cost condition as a function of µj is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
j
'
jI
j p
C
MR 1  = βj∙(V/Kj). 
16. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) argue that firms’ fixed effects should not be eliminated from the regression since 
part of the intangible assets of the firm may be part of the idiosyncratic component of the valuation model. However, 
if omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory variables included in the regression, the estimated coefficients of 
the latter will be biased. Since bank fixed effects can always be recovered from the residuals of the regression, if needed, 
we opt for an estimation procedure that eliminates the fixed bank effects from the estimation (first differences in the 
variables) in order to minimize estimation bias in the parameters. 
17. The degree of persistence of a variable refers to the dependence of the new values on its past history. Suppose that 
the variable xt is explained by an autoregressive stochastic process; persistence is higher as the coefficient of the lagged 
variable is closer to one. 
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3.2.2 INVESTMENT EQUATION 
The empirical specification of (8) is formulated as 
 
J={IT, Ad , FE};   ηi ,uit ~ iid(0, σk); k={η, u} 
 
(12) 
The dependent variable is the investment rate of Physical assets. The q ratio of 
economic value over physical assets of the bank is expressed in logs18; the coefficient ϕ1 
(equal to the inverse of the slope parameter of the adjustment cost function for physical 
assets) is expected to be non-negative. The coefficients of the normalized investment flow 
of the remaining assets, ζj, are expected to be non-positive. We expect χ1 <0 and χ2 >0 
from the contribution of intangible assets. Finally γ1 >0 and γ2 <0 if banks have market power. 
The sign of the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the investment equation correspond 
to the signs of the explanatory variables of the valuation equation, which provides a 
robustness test for the multi- assets model of the banking firm. 
As investment rates present a large cross-section and time-series variation, the 
System GMM estimation technique is not required here, and the investment equation 
will be estimated with the first-differenced GMM estimator using as instruments the lags t-2 
and t-3 of the explanatory variables. 
3.3 Results 
The results of the estimation of the valuation equation are presented in Table 4. Column 1 
shows the estimated elasticity when the economic value is explained only as a function of 
the stocks of market- purchased assets. The estimated elasticity is statistically significant 
for the four assets, and the estimated values are in a range between 0.18 and 0.27. 
Therefore, according to this estimation, the relative contribution of each market-purchased 
asset to the economic value of the bank is similar for all, and in a range between 18.3% and 
26.6% of the total economic value (the equal elasticity and sum of elasticity for all assets 
equal to 1 hypotheses cannot be rejected, p values of 0.95 and 0.27, respectively). 
Column 2 adds KHhigh and high ITjKH K× to the list of explanatory variables; the 
estimated coefficient of KHhigh is positive, and that of high ITjKH K×  negative, both being 
statistically significant. The estimated elasticity of economic value with respect to IT capital 
rises to 35% for banks with low training expenditures, and decreases to 7% (35%-28%), not 
significantly different from zero, for banks with high training expenditures. On the other hand, 
since the mean value of log of economic value in the sample is 12.11, the relative contribution 
of intangibles from training to economic value is 19.6%  (2.33/12.11).The empirical evidence 
is consistent with the hypothesis that training expenditures contribute to economic value, 
providing intangible assets which facilitate the adoption of IT investments by banks, but 
at the same time part of the economic value of the bank has to compensate for the 
cost of intangibles. In fact, when the model is estimated with only KHhigh (i.e. excluding 
the cross effect) the estimated coefficient of KHhigh is not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting that benefits from intangibles originated in training activities just compensate 
for the costs of training. One indirect way to capture the benefits from training expenditures 
                                                                          
18. Bond and Cummins (2001) provide an econometric justification for the semi-log approximation to the q model of 
investment, based on a possible multiplicative structure of the measurement error in the variables. 
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is to compare the stock of IT capital of banks with high and low training expenditures. 
The difference between log of the stock of IT per worker of banks with high and banks with 
low training expenditures (controlling for time effects) is statistically significant; the estimated 
mean value of the difference implies that the stock of IT per worker in banks with high training 
expenditures is, on average, 50% higher than in the other banks. 
Finally, the empirical valuation model is modified, introducing as explanatory variables 
the interest from deposits ID and the gross profits from loans GPL (column 3). The respective 
estimated coefficients are 0.22 and 0.02. This implies that rents from market power 
contribute 24% to the economic value of the bank, and that most of the contribution appears 
to come from market power in deposit markets19. Once the contribution of market power is 
isolated, the relative contribution of the assets is reduced in a significant way, with the 
exception of the contribution of Financial assets. The highest reduction is for Advertising, 
with an estimated elasticity 50% lower and no longer statistically different from zero, and 
for intangible assets built from training expenditures; the estimated coefficient of KHhigh 
in column 3 is only half of what it was in column 2. For IT and Physical capital, their respective 
estimated contributions are 30% and 20% lower. 
Summarizing the results from column 3 of Table 4, the economic value of banks in 
the sample is distributed in value attributed to assets used in production and sales, and value 
attributed to market power as follows: in banks with low training expenditures, 18% to 
Physical assets; 27% to IT; 24% to Financial assets (residual equity); and 24% to market 
power. The estimated contribution of advertising is 8%, but the value is not significantly 
different from zero. In banks with high training expenditures, the contribution of IT is 12% 
(not statistically significant), but their economic value is 10% higher than banks with low 
training expenditures, a difference in value that can be attributed to the cost of the increase 
in human capital that results from the higher training intensity. 
3.3.1 INVESTMENT 
We now turn to the investment equation, Table 5. The sequence of estimated empirical 
models parallels that of Table 4 and, over all, the results of the valuation and investment 
equations are mutually consistent and consistent also with the theoretical analysis. 
The estimated coefficient of Phqln  is positive and statistically significant, and the estimated 
coefficients of investment flows in IT and Advertising capital are negative and statistically 
significant, exactly as the model predicts. The estimated coefficient of Financial assets is not 
rejected to be equal to zero, suggesting that banks have generally been operating with 
non-binding regulatory capital constraint. When the variable of training expenditures is added 
as an explanatory variable of investment (column 2), the coefficient of KHhigh is negative, which 
confirms that investment in intangibles behaves similarly to investment in other assets. On the 
other hand, for those banks with KHhigh = 1, the adjustment cost of investment in IT is not 
significantly different from zero (-0.677+ 0.793 = 0.116), consistent with the prediction 
from equation (3.2), which determines the optimal investment path for the firm with valuable 
intangibles: higher intangible capital, in the form of human capital accumulated through 
training, implies a lower adjustment cost of investing in IT capital. The coefficient of 
investment in IT for banks with low training expenditures is higher than the average for all 
banks in column 1 (-0.677 compared with -0.276). 
                                                                          
19. Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2006) report the Lerner index for loans by Spanish banks as being much 
lower than the Lerner index for deposits, not counting the unremunerated deposits, which are consistent with the finding 
of this paper of a higher contribution to economic value for rents from deposits than for rents from loans. 
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Column 3 of Table 5 shows the results of the estimation equation when the variables 
that control for market power are added to the empirical model. The coefficient of ID, interest 
on deposits, is negative as expected, while the coefficient of gross profits in loans is now 
non-significant. The results are consistent with the market power of banks in deposit markets. 
Adding the market power variables increases the estimated coefficient of the Phqln variable 
(which captures the marginal return (cost) from Physical capital in an inverse way) and lowers 
the absolute value of the coefficient of Advertising, again consistent with the pattern of results 
observed in Table 4 and with the theoretical predictions20. 
Comparing the theoretical investment equation (12) with the empirical one 
[equation (8)], it is possible to recover the parameters of the original adjustment cost functions 
for the respective assets. The slope of the adjustment cost function of investment in physical 
assets, b1, is equal to 20 (1/0.05). To calibrate the importance of adjustment costs for 
investment in physical assets, notice that if the rate of investment differs from the stationary 
rate by, for example, 5 percentage points, the adjustment cost will represent 2.5% of the 
stock of invested physical capital [substituting these values in the adjustment cost function (2) 
we have 20/2 (0.05)2 pK = 2.5% of pK]. For IT, the calculations give an adjustment cost 
parameter for banks with low training expenditures equal to b2 = 0.65 ∙ b1 ∙ 0.97/0.65 = 19.4 
(the calculation takes into account the different depreciation rates; 0.35 for IT and 0.03 for 
Physical capital). In the case of advertising, the estimated coefficient in the investment 
equation is only marginally statistically significant. 
3.3.2 MEASUREMENT OF INTANGIBLES 
Section 2 shows that, under certain assumptions of proportionality between the stock of 
unobservable intangibles and the stock of observable market purchased assets, it is possible 
to obtain the estimates of the hidden intangibles from the estimated marginal return of 
measurable assets. It is clear that the relative contribution of asset j to the economic value 
of the bank µj includes the purchase cost of the asset and the adjustment cost of intangibles 
built in the process of investing in asset j: V/K)Cp()V/K()V/K(V j
'
jIjjjj
'
jKj
+=== λµ . 
Therefore, the relative importance of intangibles, at production cost, in the economic value 
of the bank, is given by V/Kp)V/K(C jjjj
'
jI
−= µ . That is, the intangibles from the 
market-purchased asset j, relative to the economic value of the bank, are equal to 
the difference between the elasticity of economic value of the stock of asset j, minus the 
ratio of the stock of asset j at market purchase price over the economic value of the bank. 
The calculations of the difference between elasticity of economic value to the stock 
of asset j, and the average ratio of purchase cost of the asset to economic value, give the 
following results (the p value of the test of the null hypothesis that the difference is equal 
to zero): -0.036 (0.84) for Physical assets; -0.09 (0.13) for Financial assets; 0.25  (0.01) for IT 
in banks with low training expenditures; 0.10 (0.32) for IT in banks with high training 
expenditures; and 0.083 (0.35) for Advertising. The difference in economic value between 
banks of high and low training expenditures (controlling for the other variables) represents 9% 
of the value of the bank with high training. Therefore, the differential cost of intangibles 
built through training expenditures in banks with high expenditures is 9% of the economic 
value of the bank. 
In banks with low training expenditures, the estimated cost of intangibles 
represents 24% of the value of the bank. Low training expenditures forces banks to slow 
                                                                          
20. The estimated coefficient of ln qPh goes up from 0.03 in the first estimation to 0.05 in the last; this estimation can be 
compared with the 0.082 value of the coefficient obtained by Bond and Cummins (2001), for firms from all industries. 
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down the investment process in IT (the stock of IT capital per worker in these banks is one 
half of the stock in banks with high training expenditures, on average) and this has a net 
negative effect on the overall size of the bank: for the full sample, the average economic 
value of banks with high training expenditures is 80% larger than the average economic value 
of banks with low training. In banks with high training expenditures, intangibles around IT 
(not counting those directly measured through the training variable) are 10% of the value 
of the bank, although this estimate is not statistically different from zero (p value of 0.32) 21. 
The non-rejection of the null hypothesis of zero intangibles is repeated in all assets, except IT 
in banks with low training expenditures22. 
3.3.3 ACCOUNTING OR ECONOMIC DATA 
The economic valuation and the investment behaviour of banks could also be examined using 
raw accounting data publicized in the externally reported balance sheet and income 
statements. It might happen that expenditures in IT and advertising create assets that 
depreciate within the year, so the two are properly reported as costs of the period. 
And that the book value of the reported assets was the right measure of their replacement 
cost. In fact, those that value intangible assets as the difference between market value and 
book value of the firm implicitly assume that all market purchased assets are reported at 
current or replacement costs. One way to investigate the relevance of the adjustments 
made in accounting data to measure material and immaterial assets and value them at their 
replacement costs, as it is done in this paper, is to see whether or not the value 
and investment behaviour of banks are explained by raw accounting data, and compare 
the results with those obtained using economically adjusted data. 
In the asset side of the balance sheet we can identify two types of resources, 
physical assets different from IT and IT related assets. Therefore, when restricted to raw 
accounting data the valuation equation will explain the present value of future profits of the 
bank as a function of the physical, IT and Financial assets at book values. In the same vein, 
the investment equation will explain the investment flow in physical capital as a function of 
Tobin’s q and the flows of IT and of Financial assets. The unadjusted economic value of the 
bank will be obtained from equation (10), taking as profits those reported by banks in their 
income statement (unadjusted). The Tobin’s q is obtained dividing the unadjusted estimated 
economic value by the book value of the equity of the bank (the same as reported in Table 3). 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimations. If one uses raw accounting data in 
explaining the economic value of banks the conclusion will be that the only resource 
that significantly contributes to the economic value of banks is the physical capital with 25% 
of the total value. Market power on the other hand appears to contribute as much as 50% to 
the economic value, a clearly unreasonable result. Most likely this variable is also 
capturing the contribution of the rest of immaterial assets not fully captured by the 
observable book valued physical and financial assets. In the investment equation estimation 
using raw accounting data none of the explanatory variables is statistically significant at 
the 5% level or less, so the raw accounting data can not explain the flow of investments. 
                                                                          
21. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) find that one dollar of stock of IT capital generates almost 12 dollars of intangibles 
in their sample of US firms, not controlling for market power. Our estimate of this measure of intangibles (weighted for 
banks with high and low training expenditures) is 9 euros of intangibles per euro of IT capital, after controlling for market 
power. 
22. Notice that the net marginal contribution of Financial assets to economic value is -9%, statistically significant at 13%. 
Apparently banks are unable to obtain a return above the opportunity cost for the financial assets where they invest 
the regulatory capital in excess of that used to finance directly productive assets (i.e. in excess of that invested in 
branches, IT, advertising). 
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On the other hand, the investment equation using economically adjusted data behaves 
as expected according to the theoretical model. It is clear then that economically adjusted 
and, extended, data on material and immaterial assets are relevant to explain the investment 
behaviour of banks. 
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4 Conclusion 
The importance attributed to intangibles in the modern firm is as great as the lack of 
knowledge of the nature, origin and valuation method of this type of assets. This paper makes 
a distinction between material, immaterial and intangible assets, in the process of explaining 
the economic value of Spanish banks during the period 1984-2003, and provides a 
conceptual framework to disaggregate the economic value of banks into the current purchase 
cost of market-supplied assets (physical, IT and advertising), the cost of internally-produced 
intangibles, and the value attributed to rents from market power. The framework draws on the 
theory of investment for the multi-asset bank with adjustment costs and market power, 
and the empirical analysis of the determinants of banks’ economic value is complemented 
with the empirical estimation of the investment model resulting from the value-maximizing 
problem. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that the investment behaviour of Spanish 
banks in the sample is well described by the posed value maximization problem, in such a 
way that banks set a value-maximizing investment rate that equals marginal benefits and 
marginal adjustment costs of growth. 
The optimal value-maximizing behaviour of banks implies optimal decisions, over 
time, on the capital stock of the market-purchased and internally-produced (intangible) 
assets. The theoretical results empirically tested here are on the determinants of the 
economic value of the bank. Such determinants are the purchase cost at current market 
prices of material and immaterial assets, the production cost of immaterial assets 
(costsof training workers in the use of IT in our illustration) and the capitalized rents from 
market power. We only find evidence of internally-produced intangibles from the adjustment 
costs incurred in IT investment, and more particularly, from the costs of training workers 
to use these investments more effectively. Such intangibles represent up to 20% of the 
economic value of the bank for those banks with low training expenditures, that is, 20% 
of their economic value represents the anticipated cost of expenditures not yet made, in 
adjusting the internal conditions to allow IT investments to become fully productive. 
Banks with high training expenditures are 10% more valuable than banks with low 
expenditures, which is interpreted as an estimate of the cost of efforts in training workers in 
computers and IT. In compensation for this cost, banks with high training expenditures 
invest at a higher rate and accumulate, on average for the whole period, a stock of IT per 
worker 50% higher than that of banks with low training expenditures. 
 Another component of value is the rents from market power, which represent, on 
average, up to 24% of the economic value of the banks. The average Tobin’s q exceeds 
the competitive value of 1 by 47% [average value of 1.9 and (1.9-1)/1.9 =0.47]. Therefore, 
rents from market power represent almost one half of this excess in economic value. The rest 
would be attributed to intangibles. The separation between the contribution to economic 
value attributed to intangibles, and the contribution due to market power (which, a priori, 
cannot be attributed to any particular asset) is one of the main results of the paper, compared 
with previous work on valuation. Ex-post, the empirical results show that advertising 
and training are the assets which contribute the most to the rents from market power of 
banks (but not the only ones). 
The empirical evidence also indicates that information about expenditures on 
immaterial and intangible assets is valuable in explaining the real decisions of firms. The banks 
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of the sample are not affected by strategic behaviour in response to certain reporting 
practices since information on immaterial and intangible assets used in the analysis is private 
(it is not even published in indirect sources, such as industry reports of firms’ expenditures 
on IT or advertising). Moreover, these banks are unlisted and the only public information 
available to externally evaluate their performance is that provided by accounting statements. 
Our results suggest that the real decisions of banks are dictated by internal measures of 
performance, not by external, accounting-based measures. However, we do not know 
if changes in disclosure regulation concerning intangibles would induce some strategic 
behaviour by banks that would be anticipated by external observers and, in turn, would 
affect the real decisions in line with the results of Kanodia et al. (2004). Since managers do 
not have to communicate with distant shareholders (only reporting to the board of directors), 
the incentives to produce information might be different and, by expanding the information 
about expenditures on intangibles, there would be a net social gain, in terms of a better 
empirical ex-post explanation of the real behaviour of firms. 
One important limitation of the paper is that these banks are not listed on the stock 
market and, therefore, the market value of equity as an external estimate of the economic 
value is not available. The application of the framework to listed firms would allow extending 
the empirical analysis to issues such as the value-relevance of intangibles. A second limitation 
of the paper is that training expenditures are only partially approximated. Such expenditures 
prove to be a good proxy for the adjustment costs of growth, and it would be quite important 
—in terms of refining the results— to have more detailed year- and bank-level data on the 
total training expenditures of banks. 
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TABLE 1. MARKET VALUE OF SPANISH BANKS (Vt) AND VALUE AT REPLACEMENT COST OF THEIR CAPITAL STOCKS. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. 
Millions of euros 1984-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.
1984 187 76 311 45 16 87 3.0 1.0 5.3 1.6 0.7 2.5 38 9 104
1985 207 80 349 49 19 91 3.3 1.2 5.4 1.8 0.7 2.8 48 12 129
1986 266 93 483 53 19 101 4.3 1.8 6.3 1.9 0.9 2.8 59 14 156
1987 293 120 543 51 21 89 4.4 2.2 6.2 2.0 1.0 2.8 75 22 186
1988 333 135 608 63 25 117 5.0 2.8 6.3 2.2 1.1 3.1 76 23 188
1989 648 161 1394 115 40 277 6.4 3.7 7.3 2.6 1.3 3.4 102 28 228
1990 779 171 1829 126 42 315 6.7 4.0 7.5 2.9 1.6 3.6 107 28 245
1991 756 196 1532 194 53 435 7.7 4.1 8.4 3.4 1.7 4.2 133 37 291
1992 581 180 1166 163 55 352 7.8 4.9 8.1 3.8 1.9 4.3 144 52 286
1993 501 145 1048 165 55 350 7.9 5.0 8.1 4.0 2.1 4.4 206 70 438
1994 532 170 1089 153 59 281 7.7 5.1 7.6 4.0 2.3 4.4 210 77 391
1995 923 159 3992 155 61 327 7.7 5.1 7.6 4.4 2.8 4.5 233 91 450
1996 742 174 2196 189 67 424 8.6 6.4 8.2 4.6 3.1 4.5 282 114 532
1997 673 246 1072 208 75 412 9.5 7.1 8.3 4.9 3.6 4.6 297 128 534
1998 859 316 1345 242 80 505 10.3 8.7 8.5 5.3 4.0 4.6 329 152 568
1999 1152 435 1892 238 93 480 10.3 8.5 8.5 5.2 3.9 4.6 316 165 470
2000 1637 584 3753 278 107 615 10.8 9.0 8.7 5.3 3.9 4.7 369 192 593
2001 2179 674 4854 365 130 754 11.9 9.9 8.7 5.8 4.9 4.8 629 245 1622
2002 2248 839 4968 403 145 802 12.4 10.5 8.8 6.1 5.3 4.9 703 267 1779
2003 2254 930 4455 422 187 725 12.8 11.5 8.8 6.4 5.8 4.9 637 304 1120
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TABLE 2. INVESTMENT RATES IN MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL ASSETS 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 1984-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.
1984 5.85 3.94 10.54 43.71 44.10 17.55 38.60 37.22 11.25 25.14 26.33 49.02
1985 2.33 2.63 10.35 50.71 49.56 18.47 38.38 36.49 12.35 38.16 26.88 32.80
1986 3.06 1.77 9.58 39.81 38.78 16.47 36.46 35.05 11.60 44.82 39.05 43.99
1987 1.75 1.17 9.11 43.57 43.37 15.14 36.78 37.85 10.17 30.91 22.80 35.75
1988 4.73 2.60 8.95 42.46 43.50 14.86 41.50 39.77 15.11 19.93 15.55 42.71
1989 5.86 3.28 8.79 42.25 41.89 14.50 41.62 39.47 15.39 5.99 8.59 43.37
1990 5.84 3.54 8.09 40.63 38.89 15.03 43.43 42.30 15.31 14.81 13.33 33.23
1991 4.96 2.55 8.72 41.82 40.99 14.01 41.44 37.35 16.17 9.31 12.02 40.22
1992 3.78 2.88 7.82 38.86 36.89 16.19 36.75 34.96 12.27 27.02 24.16 34.67
1993 3.31 2.01 6.81 39.41 38.41 13.75 33.92 33.11 12.23 22.65 20.23 34.75
1994 1.92 0.53 5.74 41.43 40.12 14.48 34.05 33.43 13.45 20.95 18.48 31.51
1995 1.11 0.77 5.42 40.59 40.81 14.66 35.61 33.93 15.68 18.87 16.18 26.29
1996 6.32 5.17 8.98 40.96 42.04 14.19 35.20 34.68 13.42 11.45 11.14 28.73
1997 0.99 0.27 4.53 42.11 43.26 14.03 37.20 36.26 13.91 13.61 12.17 26.13
1998 0.91 0.31 5.50 42.08 41.90 11.97 35.14 35.40 9.27 11.19 9.06 31.02
1999 0.48 0.34 5.01 43.60 42.35 12.04 32.99 33.49 11.94 2.95 8.78 28.61
2000 0.59 1.02 5.31 42.43 41.17 10.76 34.66 34.36 11.50 4.61 9.58 32.03
2001 2.58 1.54 6.09 43.26 43.68 10.44 36.11 35.22 11.23 5.84 6.75 24.70
2002 1.04 0.50 4.72 39.58 38.80 9.99 34.59 35.05 8.44 8.10 7.15 22.58
2003 1.79 0.76 5.40 38.91 39.90 10.18 33.00 33.29 6.27 2.90 5.04 26.02
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TABLE 3. TOBIN’S Q COMPUTED AT REPLACEMENT COST AND BOOK VALUE 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 1984-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Median Std.Dev. 10th perc 90th perc Median Std.Dev. 10th perc 90th perc
1984 2.98 2.72 0.66 7.28 3.10 3.08 0.65 8.10
1985 2.67 2.67 0.59 7.05 3.07 3.17 0.73 8.60
1986 2.85 2.70 0.61 6.80 3.86 4.49 0.78 8.63
1987 2.95 1.98 0.76 5.78 3.32 2.80 0.81 7.39
1988 2.58 2.26 0.61 5.54 3.46 3.91 0.86 8.86
1989 2.03 3.24 0.46 5.97 2.80 3.56 0.43 7.81
1990 2.18 4.13 0.59 6.17 2.59 5.97 0.64 6.98
1991 1.75 3.45 0.55 5.08 2.49 5.42 0.65 6.77
1992 1.31 2.08 0.42 3.93 1.95 2.86 0.53 5.41
1993 1.12 0.99 0.45 3.07 1.53 1.52 0.51 4.20
1994 0.94 0.79 0.39 2.31 1.33 1.08 0.50 3.05
1995 0.99 1.04 0.25 2.63 1.07 1.05 0.39 2.97
1996 1.09 1.09 0.37 2.64 1.33 1.08 0.46 3.15
1997 1.03 0.96 0.41 2.49 1.42 1.13 0.54 3.32
1998 1.17 1.21 0.45 2.76 1.87 1.45 0.61 3.70
1999 1.67 1.33 0.57 3.08 2.45 1.85 0.79 4.03
2000 1.91 1.71 0.54 3.50 2.75 2.20 0.93 4.12
2001 1.91 1.65 0.74 3.19 2.58 2.33 1.30 3.98
2002 1.70 1.70 0.69 2.69 2.44 2.13 1.17 3.73
2003 1.66 0.94 0.66 2.64 2.25 1.05 1.09 3.58
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TABLE 4.  ESTIMATION OF THE VALUATION EQUATION FOR SPANISH BANKS 
Estimation of j highit j it i it i it it
j J
lnV ln K ln HK b ln  ID b lnGLP m
∈
= α + β + γ + + + η + + ε∑ 1 2 ; J={Ph, IT, AD, FE}. Vit is 
the market value of the bank computed according to (11). Ph IT AD FEit it it itK ,K ,K ,K stand for the value of the stock 
of Physical, IT, Advertisement and Financial assets held by bank i at the beginning of period t, valued at 
replacement cost. highiHK  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bank i if the average value of the 
stock of human capital held by the bank over the period is above the median of the distribution, and IDit, GLPit 
are, respectively, the value of the deposit interests and gross loan profits of bank i at time t. Finally, ηi 
captures the fixed effects of bank i, mit the measurement errors of the stocks of capital and εit is the error 
term. All the variables are expressed in logs. The model has been estimated with the System-GMM technique, 
which estimates the valuation equation in first-differences jointly with the valuation equation in levels. The 
instrumental variables for the first-differenced equation are the levels of the explanatory variables in period t-3 
and t-4. The instrumental variables for the levels equation are the first-differences of the explanatory variables 
in period t-2. All estimations contain time-dummy variables. P-values of the tests of Sargan and lack of first 
and second-order autocorrelation are presented at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. (*) = Significant at 10%     (**) = Significant at 5%    (***) = Significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
K Ph 0.232 *** 0.256 *** 0.179 **
(0.082) (0.081) (0.085)
K IT 0.266 *** 0.353 *** 0.275 ***
(0.094) (0.115) (0.089)
K AD 0.183 ** 0.193 ** 0.090
(0.087) (0.082) (0.077)
K FE 0.244 *** 0.241 *** 0.241 ***
(0.078) (0.076) (0.063)
HK high 2.328 * 1.467 **
(1.205) (0.736)
HK high  ∙ K IT -0.277 * -0.182 *
(0.151) (0.094)
ID 0.215 ***
(0.075)
GLP 0.019 *
(0.011)
Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 st  order 0.187 0.193 0.107
2 nd  order 0.800 0.872 0.930
N.Obs 1847 1847 1847
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TABLE 5.  ESTIMATION OF THE INVESTMENT EQUATION FOR SPANISH BANKS 
Estimation of Ph j ITPh high highit it it it
it j i itPh Ph Ph Ph Ph
j Jit it it it it
I I ID IGLPln q KH KH u
K K K K K∈− − − − −
⎛ ⎞= β + β + β + γ + γ + δ + δ × + η +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑0 1 1 2 1 21 1 1 1 1
; J={IT, Ad, FE}. Phitq  is 
the ratio between Vit and PhitK . 
IT Ph Ad Ph FE Ph
it it it it it itI / K ,I / K ,I / K− − − − − −1 1 1 1 1 1 stand for the investment of IT, Advertising and 
Financial assets with respect to the stock of physical capital at the beginning of the period held by bank i. 
high
iHK  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bank i if the average value of the stock of human 
capital held by the bank over the period is above the median of the distribution, and IDit, GLPit are, 
respectively, the value of the deposit interests and gross loan profits of bank i at time t. Finally, ηi captures the 
fixed effect of bank i, and εit is the error term. The model has been estimated with the First-Difference GMM 
technique. The instrumental variables for the first-differenced equation are the levels of the explanatory 
variables in period t-2 and t-3. All estimations contain time-dummy variables. P-values of the tests of Sargan 
and lack of first and second-order autocorrelation are presented at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. (*) = Significant at 10%     (**) = Significant at 5%    (***) = Significant at 1%. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
q Ph 0.026 *** 0.036 *** 0.047 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
I IT / K Ph -0.276 *** -0.677 *** -0.655 ***
(0.099) (0.158) (0.162)
I Ad / K Ph -0.942 ** -1.465 * -1.102
(0.381) (0.878) (0.851)
I FE / K Ph -0.010 -0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
HK high -0.052 *** -0.067 ***
(0.005) (0.006)
HK high  ∙ K IT 0.793 *** 0.920 ***
(0.231) (0.286)
ID  / K Ph -0.046 **
(0.019)
GLP  / K Ph 0.005
(0.027)
Sargan 0.995 0.443 0.737
1 st  order 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 nd  order 0.667 0.726 0.941
N.Obs 1667 1667 1667
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TABLE 6.  VALUATION AND INVESTMENT EQUATIONS WITH RAW AND WITH ECONOMICALLY 
ADJUSTED ACCOUNTING DATA 
The left half of the table shows the estimation of 
j
it j it it i it it
j J
lnV ln K b ln  ID b ln GLP m
∈
= α + β + + + η + + ε∑ 1 2 , J={Ph, IT, AD, FE} and the right half the estimation of 
itiPh
it
Ph
it
it
Jj
Ph
it
j
it
j
Ph
itPh
it
Ph
it u
K
GLP
K
ID
K
Iq
K
I ++++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛++=
−−∈ −−
∑ ηγγβββ
1
2
1
1
1
10
1
ln , J={IT, AD, FE}  Vit is the market value of the 
bank, FEit
AD
it
IT
it
Ph
it KKKK ,,,  stand for the  value  of the stock of Physical, IT, Advertisement and  Financial 
assets held by bank i at the beginning of period t, Phitq  is the ratio between Vit and 
Ph
itK ; 
IT Ph Ad Ph FE Ph
it it it it it itI / K ,I / K ,I / K− − − − − −1 1 1 1 1 1  stand for the investment of IT, Advertising and Financial assets with respect 
to the stock of physical capital at the beginning of the period.and IDit, GLPit are, respectively, the value of the 
deposit interests and gross loan profits of bank i at time t. We present the estimations of the valuation 
and investment equations using raw accounting data (Book version) and using data at replacement cost 
(Econ version). The econometric procedure followed to estimate the valuation and investment equations 
are explained in Table 4 and 5, respectively. P-values of the tests of Sargan and lack of second-order 
autocorrelation are presented at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. (*) = Significant at 10%     (**) = Significant at 5%    (***) = Significant at 1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
Econ version Econ version
K Ph 0.253 ** 0.171 ** q Ph 0.027 0.048 ***
(0.120) (0.071) (0.036) (0.011)
K IT 0.099 0.216 ** I IT / K Ph 0.072 -0.341 **
(0.066) (0.099) (0.342) (0.151)
K AD 0.114 I Ad / K Ph -1.518 *
(0.086) (0.805)
K FE 0.097 0.260 *** I FE / K Ph 0.005 -0.001
(0.076) (0.065) (0.009) (0.006)
ID 0.482 *** 0.183 ** ID  / K Ph -0.002 * -0.032 **
(0.127) (0.075) (0.001) (0.016)
GLP 0.055 0.023 ** GLP  / K Ph -0.001 0.003
(0.034) (0.011) (0.006) (0.024)
2nd  Autocorr 0.678 0.953 2nd  Autocorr 0.248 0.543
Sargan 0.285 1.000 Sargan 0.038 0.953
Book version Book version
VALUATION EQUATION INVESTMENT EQUATION
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APPENDIX 1: Summary of methodology used to estimate the stock of assets for 
Spanish banks 
A detailed explanation of the calculations and complementary data needed to obtain the 
replacement cost of assets and user cost of capital is contained in Martín-Oliver, 
Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007). The replacement cost of an asset is obtained applying 
the permanent inventory method, as follows. 
Let It be the gross investment flow of new capital services in year t; Kt the stock of 
homogeneous capital services at the end of year t; φ the depreciation rate of the asset used in 
production activities during a one-year period; µ the rate of technological progress 
incorporated into capital services invested during one year, with respect to those invested 
one year before. And let qt be the price of one unit of services in period t. The permanent 
inventory model implies, 
( )tt t t t t t
t
pp K p I p K
p − −−
−φ= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+µ 1 11
1
1
 (1) 
The formulation takes into account the fact that, to replace in t one unit of capital 
service in place at the end of the previous year, t-1, with the technical progress in 
capital goods of the period, only 1/(1+µ) units are needed. Depreciation implies that for 
each unit of capital in place in t-1, there is only (1-φ) units remaining at the end of the year. 
This computation of the net capital services is exact when the depreciation of the 
asset is exponential at rate φ. The actual application of the formula requires finding data on 
investment flows, prices, depreciation and technological progress rates. 
In the case of physical capital (buildings plus non-IT fixed assets) investment flows of 
period t are set equal to amortization of physical capital in period t, as reported by the bank 
in the income statement, plus the difference between net book value of physical assets in 
year t and year t-1. For IT capital, a distinction is made between booked IT assets and IT 
expenditures expensed in the income statement. For booked IT assets, we assume that book 
value is equal to replacement value, while IT expenditures are capitalized using the permanent 
inventory method. Total IT capital of year t is the sum of the two stocks. Finally, the flow of 
advertising capital is the year expenditure in advertising as reported in the income statement 
of the bank. 
The term (1-φ)/(1+µ) is substituted by (1-δ) where δ is the overall economic 
depreciation rate. The value of δ  is 0.03 for buildings, 0.15 for fixed assets different from IT, 
0.35 for IT capital, 0.35 for advertising capital. These values are in line with others used in 
the literature. The price index of buildings is taken from the Ministerio de Fomento and the 
price index of other non-IT fixed capital is set equal to the price deflator of gross capital 
formation. We assume that the price index of quality-adjusted IT capital is zero, and the price 
index of advertising capital is the price of market services published by the Spanish Institute 
of Statistics. The zero inflation rate of the price of IT capital services departs from the 15% 
to 20% decline assumed in other studies with US data, Litchenberg (1995), since, in Spain, 
general inflation is much higher than in the US and technological innovations are usually 
introduced at a later time. 
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